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Abstract: 
Protection of indications of geographical origin (GIs) can reduce information asymmetry 
between producers and consumers, and potentially enhance trade. However, GIs can also 
possibly divert trade.  We rely on panel data about agri-food trade among the 27 countries of 
the European Union to investigate these issues using variations of estimators proposed by Head 
and Mayer (2000) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Our findings suggest that the 
protection of GIs creates trade when the importing and exporting countries have GI-protected 
products. There is also empirical evidence regarding a trade-diverting effect when the importing 
country does not have GIs and a border enlargement effect arising from European GI-
protection. 
 
Résumé:  
La protection des indications géographiques (IGs) est un enjeu controversé, autant dans les 
négociations à l’OMC que dans les négociations d’accords bilatéraux, tel que constaté lors de 
l’accord de libre-échange entre le Canada et l’Union Européenne (UE). En général, les pays nord-
américains protègent les IGs comme des marques de commerce, considérant qu’il est possible 
de répliquer les méthodes de production associées à celles-ci dans un pays, autre que leur lieu 
d’origine. Par exemple, du fromage parmesan et du jambon de Parme sont fabriqués et 
commercialisés au Canada sous ces désignations. L’UE appuie une approche de terroir, 
soutenant que seuls les producteurs localisés dans une région donnée peuvent se prévaloir du 
terme géographique associé à cette région pour désigner leurs produits. Les IGs peuvent réduire 
les problèmes d’asymétrie d’information entre consommateurs et producteurs et faire 
augmenter le commerce. Toutefois, les IGs peuvent aussi en principe créer une diversion de 
commerce favorisant les exportateurs bénéficiant d’indications géographiques au détriment 
d’autres exportateurs. Nous tentons de vérifier cette assertion sur les pays de l’UE parce que 
ces derniers pratiquent le libre-échange entre eux et qu’ils sont tous soumis à la législation 
européenne sur les IGs. En utilisant des données de type panel sur le commerce des 27 pays, 
nos résultats indiquent que le commerce entre pays exportateurs et importateurs qui ont tous 
les deux des produits protégés comme IGs s’accroît de 0,76%, après avoir contrôlé pour la 
distance, la taille des pays, l’utilisation d’une langue commune et autres facteurs pouvant 
influencer le commerce. Toutefois, des effets de diversion de commerce sont aussi constatés 
lorsque le pays importateur ne produit pas de IGs. De plus, un effet de renforcement des 
frontières nationales se confirme avec le système européen de protection des IGs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, global consumer concerns about food marketing have grown 
beyond pricing and safety issues. Nowadays, consumers want to know about production 
practices (organic versus conventional versus genetically modified), animal welfare, 
production location (local versus national versus international origins), the food’s carbon 
footprint and whether it has functional properties and is traceable.  All of these concerns add 
new dimensions to the concept of food quality that encompasses more traditional criteria like 
taste, visual appearance and safety. The relative importance of various quality attributes varies 
across consumers. Most consumers are willing to trade off some attributes for others quite 
easily, but some consumers may have lexicographic preferences (e.g., organic is a must).  
Even for a controversial attribute like genetic modifications, Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux 
(2004) showed that a majority of French consumers would be willing to buy genetically 
modified foods if their price was sufficiently reduced.  Thus, new quality dimensions enhance 
product differentiation, but this differentiation can be perceived as horizontal (just different) 
or vertical (better). Labelling is a mean to achieve the matching of consumers with a strong 
valuation for a given quality attribute and suppliers of foods endowed with the quality 
attribute.  Consumers with a strong valuation for specific quality attributes are better off 
because they get what they want while the suppliers of these attributes can get higher returns 
than by marketing their products as “generic”.1 In this context, geographical indications (GIs) 
can be seen as a mechanism to signal elements of food quality pertaining to the “know how”, 
soil and weather of a given region.
2
  However, another aspect of GIs is to prevent producers 
who have the “know how”, but reside outside the designated area, from using the labelled GI.3  
                                                 
1
 A Pareto improvement is unlikely because the reduction in the supply of generic products causes the price for 
generic products to rise, thus decreasing the surplus of consumers of generic products.   Accordingly, aggregate 
consumer welfare may not improve.   
2
 The link to a geographical area can be direct as for Champagne and Parma ham or indirect as for Feta cheese 
and Greece.  
3
 For example, the Newcastle Brown Ale received a protected geographical status in 2000, but lost it in 2007 
when the brewery moved from Tyneside to Tadcaster, 150 km away.  It is doubtful that the quality of the beer 
suffered from the change in location.  Furthermore, it is possible that producers outside a designated area could 
actually produce a higher quality product.  If quality is related to climate, year to year variations may make it 
difficult to establish a reputation for quality. Even when quality can be controled by firms, Desquilbet and 
Monier-Dilhan (2012) find that GI producers may end up supplying the low quality.   
4 
 
GIs have a long history in Europe, and the same can be said about their regulation.
4
  The link 
between production location and quality is perhaps best known for wines, but it has been 
exploited for many more products, including cheeses, Cognac, Sherry, Teruel and Parma 
hams, Tuscany olives, Budějovické pivo, and Budapesti téliszalámi.  
In Europe, the interest of producers and consumers for geographical indications has 
increased over time.  There were 526 GIs in 2000, 676 in 2005 and 872 in 2010. The 
European Commission has been a strong advocate for GIs since 1992 when a regulatory 
framework was put in place to define the conditions for the registration of GIs as protected.  
GIs are also part of the rural development strategy that was at the heart of the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  Some interpreted this as a change in policy orientation 
from “increasing food quantity to increasing food quality” (Becker, 2009: 112),5 but a more 
precise interpretation would focus on product differentiation, as per the European 
Commission’s description of GIs.6  .            
The protection that accompanies GI designations has implications for international 
trade, including trade between members of the European Union.  Article 30 of the Treaty on 
European Union
7
 provides for a GI exception to the principle of free trade between member 
states. GIs are covered by WTO agreements, through Article 22 of the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).  The definition of 
GIs used by the WTO is similar to the one used in the European Union’s legislation, but WTO 
members have very different views on GIs (O’Connor, 2004). The EU sees GIs as a way to 
                                                 
4
 GIs were protected through the Paris convention for the protection of industrial property of 1883 (Josling, 
2006).   
5
 In 1992, the EU established a regulatory framework by the Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 defining the 
conditions for registration of GIs as protected. In 2006, this framework was revised in the Regulation (EC) No 
510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs. That is result of complaints by the United States and Australia against the 
European Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92. On 18 August 2003, the United States and Australia requested 
separately the establishment of a Panel. They claim that the EC measure appears to be inconsistent with the EU’s 
obligations pursuant to WTO Agreements. On 20 April 2005, Panel reports were adopted (see Panel reports: 
WT/DS290/R - Complaint by Australia; and WT/DS174/R – Complaint by United States). Since January 3th 
2013, Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs entered into force. It repealed and replaced Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006. 
6
 GI protection allows rural communities to exploit quality, reputation and other characteristics linked to their 
location http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/.    
7
 The Treaty on European Union (EU) was signed in Maastricht in 1992 and the Treaty of Rome which 
established the European Economic Community in 1958 are the core treaties laying out how the EU operates.  
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inform consumers, to foster rural development and to secure cultural and biological diversity. 
The EU has an elaborate GI regulatory system that was designed to accommodate the 
different views about GIs among European countries and avoid intra-EU conflicts resulting 
from national initiatives (Josling, 2006).  Other countries (such as the United States, Canada, 
Australia and South Africa) are reluctant to adopt such protection, preferring to rely on their 
system of trademarks and certification marks (Addor and Grazioli, 2002). These countries 
consider GIs primarily as property rights that can be used by individual firms or producers to 
enhance their competitiveness (as marketing tool to boost exports).  The EU has been 
aggressively promoting its view on GIs in the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, but 
also in bilateral negotiations with Canada, Moldova, Georgia and Vietnam.  Even though the 
final text to the Canada-European Union Trade Agreement (CETA) is not yet available, it has 
been reported that Canada has accepted to recognize 179 GIs (Plan d’Action Canada, 2013).      
The literature on GIs is thoroughly reviewed by Teuber and al (2011).  Most 
contributions have focused on the overall welfare implications of GIs or on specific welfare 
components.  Some estimated consumers’ willingness to pay for GI labelled foods (e.g., 
Scarpa Philippidis and Spalatro, 2005; van Ittersum and al., 2007).  Other studies compared 
the welfare implications of different GI certification systems on producers and consumers 
(e.g. Lence and al., 2007; Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban, 2010; Menapace and 
Moschini, 2012). Much attention has been given to the measurement of horizontal product 
differentiation/elasticities of substitution in empirical trade models (Feenstra, 2004).  
However, vertical product differentiation has recently been integrated into trade models to 
account for observed phenomena like larger firms paying more for their inputs and getting 
higher prices for their products (e.g. Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013; Crozet and al., 2012, Kugler 
and Verhoogen, 2012; Hallak, 2006).
8
 There is also a vast literature on standards and non-
tariff measures and their effect on prices (e.g. Bradford, 2003; Dean and al., 2009; Kee and 
al., 2009) and on trade flows (e.g. Winchester and al., 2012).  Our analysis of GIs falls in this 
category.     
The objective of this paper is to quantify the effect of GI regulation on bilateral agri-
food trade between member states of the European Union. We rely on a generalization of the 
                                                 
8
 Data on quality is scarce.  Hallak (2006) used the exporting country’s per capita income as a proxy for quality. 
Crozet and al. (2012) used the number of stars that a wine expert assigns as a measure of wine quality. 
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gravity model developed by Head and Mayer (2002) and on Santos Silva and Tenreyro’s 
(2006) Pseudo Poisson. Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator on a sample that covers 
three years: 1999, 2004 and 2009, and 27 European countries.  Our findings indicate that the 
European protection of geographical indications, namely protected designation of origin 
(PDO) and protected geographical indication (PGI), impacts on bilateral trade differently 
depending on whether trading nations have GI protected products.  When two countries have 
GI protected products, bilateral trade is enhanced.  This effect is large and it likely impacts 
positively on trade in non-GI products between countries that have GI protection.  One could 
conjecture that consumers in countries that have GIs tend to have preferences that are more 
alike.  In this light, the effect of GIs on trade is akin to the effect of sharing a common 
language/culture.  Because non-GI countries tend to be poorer countries in our population, our 
GI effects may also pick up effects related to non-homothetic preferences and differences in 
the average level and distribution of wealth across countries.
9
  Countries that have GIs tend to 
export less to countries that do not have GIs.  We also found that the protection of GIs has a 
trade depressing effect by increasing the thickness of the average border between EU 
countries.  This adverse effect, which is equivalent to a “home bias” tax of 1%, matters 
mainly for poorer countries without GIs.     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We specify our conceptual model 
based on the odds ratio method in section 2. We introduce a set of GI Regulation variables 
and discuss four different estimators to ascertain the robustness of our results to differences in 
variable definitions and econometric estimators.  We discuss data requirements and sources in 
section 3. Estimation results are presented and interpreted in section 4, beginning with the 
direct impact of indications of geographical origin on trade before discussing their indirect 
effect through the border effect. The last section summarizes our results and their 
implications. 
2. A GRAVITY MODEL WITH GIs  
                                                 
9
 GIs can alter rivalries between domestic and foreign firms by influencing the degree of vertical product 
differentiation, provided that enough consumers respond to the GI indication.  Hallak (2006) showed that rich 
countries tend to import relatively more from countries that produce high quality goods.  
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We rely on a gravity model estimated on disaggregated data to disentangle the effects of most 
trade impediments, like distance, trade taxes and non-tariff barriers, while taking into account 
trade-promoting factors like cultural and political “likeness” variables such as the sharing of a 
common language.  Gravity modelling was long considered a purely ad hoc empirical success 
whose theoretical foundation rested on some analogy to the law of gravity in physics.  It was 
shown starting in the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s that the gravity model can originate 
from different theoretical trade models.  Many of the recent issues about gravity models have 
focussed on empirical specification and estimation. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) demonstrated that “multilateral resistance terms” are essential in the specification of 
gravity models.  They proposed a complex non-linear estimation procedure to integrate these 
“price effects”.  Feenstra (2002) proposed to account for them through the addition of fixed 
effects for importing and exporting countries.  The notorious problem stemming from the 
large number of zero trade flows has been addressed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and 
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).  A solution that has been explored involves using the 
multiplicative structure of gravity model to eliminate the monadic terms (Head and Mayer, 
2013: 21). The odds ratio method (or odds specification) advocated by Head and Mayer 
(2000)
10
 provides an alternative framework to deal with multilateral resistance terms.
11
   This 
approach exploits the multiplicative functional form of the gravity equation by making either 
the exporters’ (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) or the importers’ (Martin and al., 2008 
or De Sousa and Disdier, 2006) fixed effects redundant.  
The utility of the representative consumer in country i is represented by a constant 
elasticity of substitution utility function (CES), which is conditioned by the quantities 
consumed ijhc , where 1,..., jh n  stands for a given variety exported by country 1,...,j N . 
All varieties are differentiated from each other, but products from the same country are 
weighted equally in the utility function. 
                                                 
10
 Head and Mayer (2000) as well as Eaton and Kortum (2002) normalized bilateral flows by trade with self for a 
given industry/year. Certain papers use a similar approach, but refer country to other than self (e.g. Martin and 
al., 2008; and Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002).  Another trade ratio approach was proposed by Caliendo and 
Parro (2012) who estimate the trade cost elasticity from tariff data, using asymmetries in protectionism as an 
identification strategy. 
11
 Some studies have used an extension of the above ratio approach, the ratio of ratios approach, to eliminate 
monadic terms, including multilateral resistance terms/time-varying exporter an importer fixed effects (see Head 
and al., (2010), Romalis (2007) and Hallak (2006).  However, gravity equation estimators that use dyadic 
transformations require measures that relate country-internal distances to external distances of countries. 
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
Ui 
j1
N
 aijc ijh 
1

h1
n j










1
                               (1) 
We denote aij as the preference weight given to exporting country j by consumers in country i. 
Parameter 

  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. 

mij  is defined as the C.I.F
12
 
value of country i’s imports from j  (

mij  cij pij ) and i ikkm m  represents expenditures 
of country i from all sources (including domestic ones). Thus, bilateral imports are given by: 
                                          

mij 
aij
1n j pij 
1
aik
1nk pik 
1
k

 mi    (2) 
where 

pij  is the price of imported varieties from country j. The proportionality between the 
value of production (denoted

v j ) and the number of varieties, 
.
j
j
j
v
n
q p
 , that arise from 
firms having identical technologies, facing identical demands and hence producing the same 
quantity q, , allows us to replace 

n j  and 

nk  in equation (1) to obtain a gravity equation 
expressed in terms of prices 

pij  and consumer preferences

aij .    
The price
13

pij  paid by consumers in country i for products from country j is specified as a 
multiplicative function of the mill price (

p j ), distance between both countries (

dij ) and 
trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers). Typically, the ad valorem value (ij) of trade 
barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers) is equal to zero for domestic products and positive for 
imported products (i.e., equal to  for i ≠ j) such that:   
                                     

pij  1ij dij p j                                                       (3) 
                                                 
12
 CIF stands for “Cost, Insurance, and Freight”.  The seller is responsible for the loading at the port of export, 
the transport to and unloading at the port of import and insurance.  The costs for these services are included in 
CIF import prices.     
13
 This price embodies trade cost. The latter can also be random, capturing unobserved trade impediments (De 
Sousa and al., 2011). 
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Because we focus on intra-EU trade, tariffs are zero and goods can move freely between 
countries.  Because there is one less factor impacting on trade flows, it should be easier to 
measure the impact of GIs on trade.   
 Consumer preferences 

aij  are decomposed into a deterministic component and a 
random component (

eij ) that is normally distributed. The deterministic component involves a 
home bias parameter (

) that measures the consumers’ relative preference for domestic 
products, GI policy indicators
14
, and dummy variables that equal one when countries i and j 
share a common border (CB), a common language (CL) and time binary variables to account 
for various phenomena such as the changes in the number of countries using a common 
currency and the last recession.
15
  Consumer preferences can be depicted as follows: 
            expij ij ij ij ija e B CB CL Label                                      (4) 
The GI policy indicators are meant to capture the trade creation and trade diversion effects 
stemming from GIs being used by the importing country, the exporting country or both.
16
 
However, given the large difference in the number of GIs across countries that have GIs, we 
feel that GI policy indicators should also account for the presence or absence of GIs and the 
number of GIs.  We specify our set of GI policy indicators as follows: 
 
_ . *
_ . *
_ . *
a a i
b b j
c c i j
I adj I N
I adj I N
I adj I N N


 
    (5) 
where iN  and jN are the number of GIs in the importing country i and exporting country j 
and , ,a b cI I I are defined as:  
                                                 
14
 We consider only GI products effectively protected by the European Union with the mention “registered.” 
15
 In 1999, the year the Euro zone was created, there were only 11 countries. In 2004, their number increased to 
12 (with the entry of Greece on 1 January 2001), and in 2009, the Euro zone had 16 members (with Slovakia, the 
last entry, on 1 January 2009). To date, there are 17 European countries using the euro as its currency (Estonia 
joined the Euro zone on 1
 
January 2011).  
16
 Poncet (2002) used a model similar to ours to analyse the trade impact of the Chinese diaspora by defining a 
variable measuring the importance of people of Chinese heritage in the population of China’s trade partners. De 
Sousa and Disdier (2006) also used a quantitative variable to measure the impact of differences in legal 
frameworks.   
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


1,if importer has GIs and exporter does not
0,otherwise
1,if exporter has GIs and importer does not
0,otherwise
1,if importer and exporter have GIs
0,otherwise
a
b
c
I
I
I



 
 
 
 
 
This specification of GI policy indicators has the advantage of accounting for differences in 
the number of GIs across country in any given year and in the evolution in the number of GIs 
over time. GIs should have a demand-expanding effect when consumers value the 
geographical designations and exporters benefit from GI protection.
17
 As such, the coefficient 
on _ .cI adj is expected to be positive.  If trade creation is to occur, it should be strongest 
amongst trading partners with GIs.  This is more so if GIs generate positive externalities on 
the demand for non-GI products in countries that have GIs. Consumers living in countries 
without GIs may not value significantly more GI protected products than unprotected 
products.  If this is the case, exporters of GI products are likely to pursue opportunities 
elsewhere and sell less in countries without GIs. If on the other hand consumers living in a 
country without GIs perceive GIs as quality signals, they might express a larger demand for 
products from countries with GIs. Thus the sign of _ .bI adj  is a priori ambiguous. If 
consumers in countries with GI products perceive products from non-GI countries as inferior, 
they will buy less from such countries all else equal.  However, GI-responsive consumers 
might value more intensely product differentiation and be more inclined to buy from different 
sources. Therefore, the coefficient for _ .aI adj  can be negative or positive.    
                                                 
17
 To see this, consider that the marginal rate of substitution between a pair of imported varieties by country i and 
originating from exporting countries 1 and 2 is given by: 
1
2 1 1
1 2 2
, 1.i k i h i h
i h i k i k
c p a
c p a
 


   
    
   
 Thus, if 2i ka  
increases because of GIs, then the relative demand for variety k from country 2 will increase.   
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 Using 
j
j
j
pq
v
n
.
 , substituting for terms (2), (3) and 

n j  in equation (1) and taking logs, 
we obtain the following gravity equation: 
 
     
ln ln ln 1 ln ln
1 ln 1 1 .
ij i j ij j i
ij ij ij ij
m m v d p IC
CB CL Label B e
  
      
     
          
                  (6) 
where iIC is the importer’s inclusive value which describes the “full range of potential 
suppliers to a given importer, taking into account their size, distance and relevant border 
effects” (Head and Mayer, 2000: 290). 
    ln exp ln ln 1 ln ln 1 .i k k ik ik ik ik ik
k
IC v p d CB CL Label B e       
                   
  
Equation (4) models country i’s imports from partner j as a function of exporter j’s 
output, aggregate imports from all sources, distance between the importing and exporting 
countries, F.O.B
18
 price levels (

p j ), common border, common language, “Label” which 
embodies GI indicator variables (Ia_adj., Ib_adj., Ic_adj.), the importing country’s inclusive 
value ( iIC ) and the constant, which can be interpreted as a border effect measure.  The 
presence of iIC  complicates the estimation
19
 and we follow Head and Mayer (2000) in using 
the log odds ratio to get rid of it.
20
 This results in the following estimable gravity equation: 
     
     
.
ln ln 1 ln ln 1 ln 1
1 1 ( 1) 1 ,
ijt jt ij jt
iit it i it
ij ij ijt t ijt
m GDP d p
m GDP d p
CB CL Time Label
     
        
       
                 
       
        
      (7) 
                                                 
18
 Free On Board (F.O.B) entails that the seller pays for transportation of goods to the port of shipment and, 
loading cost. The buyer pays the cost of marine freight transportation, insurance, uploading and transportation 
cost from the arrival port to destination. 
19
 First, because it depends on parameters that are already in the equation to be estimated; and second, this term 
putatively contains attributes of all possible origin countries for the product (Head and Mayer, 2000).  
20
 Head and Ries (2001) propose to cancel the exporter terms, multiplying ij
ii
m
m
 by ji
jj
m
m
. This leads to a simple 
index equal: ij ji
ii jj
m m
m m
 , that Eaton and al. (2011) call the Head-Ries Index (HRI). The problem with this index 
is that it cannot be calculated without a measure of trade inside a country (Head and Mayer, 2013). 
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with 

ij   1  eij eii .. ijTime is a binary variables set defined as follows: year2004 = 1 
if year=2004 and 0 otherwise, and year2009 = 1 if year=2009 and 0 otherwise. These binary 
variables are used to capture different phenomena like changes in the EU’s member states that 
have joined the common currency area, technological progress, and changes in global 
macroeconomic conditions.  This way, “Time” needs not have a monotonic effect.  In 
addition, we assume in equation (5) that ln lnj j
i i
v GDP
v GDP
   
   
   
. Variable 

mii  measures intra-
national trade: the total volume of trade occurring within a country. Following Wei (1996), 

mii  is equal to the overall production of the country minus its total exports, which gives the 
value of goods shipped from a country to its own consumers. 
id  is a measure of internal 
distance that accounts for the fact that internal trade is harder when cities within a country are 
farther rather than closer apart.  
 The inclusion of the GDP and price ratios are particularly important control variables in 
isolating the effects of the GI policy indicators because countries without GIs are typically 
poorer countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania) and richer 
countries tend to trade more with one another. 
3. DATA REQUIREMENTS 
Our panel is made up of three years: 1999, 2004 and 2009. We use aggregated flows of agri-
food imports between the 27 countries of the European Union (EU). The data set covers agri-
food products (classification: 0, 1, 4 and 22) following the SITC (Standard International 
Trade Classification) Revision 3. The regression analysis uses a total of 2045 observations 
when the Head and Mayer (2000) approach is used and 2106 when the Pseudo Poisson. 
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is used. Some of our data came from databases that 
use other classification systems such as International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), Broad Economic Categories (BEC) and the Harmonised System (HS). We merge 
these data sets using methods given by Muendler (2009) and Zerai (2007).  
 We use labour costs (wage and social charges) as a proxy for F.O.B price levels, as in 
De Sousa and Disdier (2006), to measure differences in production costs between countries. 
The data on labour costs come from EUROSTAT Statistics (NACE – Rev.2: Statistical 
13 
 
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community) and from the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database. Our bilateral trade flows 
come from the COMTRADE database. Agri-food production data are borrowed from the 
agricultural production data sets of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database 
and from the industrial production data sets of the UNIDO database. National income data 
(GDP) are from World Bank statistics. Data on variables common border (CB) and common 
language (CL) come from CEPII-Gravity Dataset.
21
 
Our empirical implementation requires the measurement of two distances: internal 
distance (di.) and external (bilateral) distance (dij). Data for both distances come from CEPII.  
The internal distance can be defined as an index of distances between major areas of 
economic activity within a country,
22
 whereas external distance measures the distance 
between states. The external (bilateral) distances are calculated between regions and weighted 
by the economic size of the regions. This method is also applied to compute the internal 
distance (di.) following the disk methodology. The calculation of both external and internal 
distances is defined as follows: 

dij 
rj
 Pri dri
ri






 Pg j
, with 

Pri 
Population ri
Population i
  and   

Prj 
Population rj
Population j
. 

di.  0,67
S
 , with S measures area of the region. Taking the value of π, we obtain di. 
with a coefficient (

 1 2) equal to 0,376. Thus, 

di.  0,376 S .  
 The variable “label” is defined as the number of protected geographical indications 
(PGI) and Protected designations of origin (PDO) under the European Regulation (EC) 
2081/92 for agricultural products. Data is available by product and type of protection from the 
European DOOR database. We focus on indications of geographical origin (GI) in force 
(with status: “registered”).23 We then use the Label variable to define our indicator variables 
                                                 
21
 See online http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm (Accessed on 2012.11.04). 
22
 Several measures have been proposed to calculate the internal distance.  Wei (1996) uses one-quarter of the 
distance to the nearest foreign economic center.  Wolf (1997, 2000) uses the distance between the two largest 
cities in each country.  As Nitsch (2000), Leamer (1997) and Head and Mayer (2000), we use the disk 
methodology which assumes that internal distance is proportional to the square root of the area of the country. 
23
 GI products with a notification status (received, published or recorded) are not considered because they are 
effectively not yet protected. 
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,a bI I  and cI .  Table 1 above gives the number of GI protected in 2009.  For the 1999-2009 
period, the average number of GI protected labels per country is 24 (with a standard deviation 
of 42.72). This suggests that there is much variation across countries and over time.  The per 
country averages for 1999 and 2009 are 16 and 32 labels respectively (100% increase in 10 
years). The difference in the number of GI protected labels (per country) is significant over 
the period: the standard deviation increases from 28.43 in 1999 to 54.24 in 2009.
24
 Table 1 
shows the extent of cross-country differences between countries. Italy and France are leading 
with 192 and 167 labels respectively, but several countries do not have any.  
Table 1. About here 
 
4. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 4.1. Econometric Estimation 
 Zeros are a common feature of bilateral trade data involving a large number of 
geographically dispersed countries. Zeros are particularly frequent when the model focuses on 
disaggregated products, as in Head and Mayer’s (2000) data involving 98 industries.25  In our 
case, our sample includes only EU countries and the trade flows are for all agricultural 
products.  As a result, there are less than 3% of the observations that are zero and a first-stage 
selection correction is not needed. The coefficients of equation (5) are typically estimated 
with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Cluster-robust standard errors are computed to account 
for correlation in the residuals over years within trade pairs. Because we have a short panel, 
the estimation of equation (5) can also be done with a random effects estimator or a fixed 
effects/within estimator. Both estimators treat the country pair intercept as a random variable, 
but the fixed effects estimator has the advantage of being consistent when the intercept is 
correlated with explanatory variables.  
                                                 
24
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for bilateral import and GI number by country in our sample between 
1999 and 2009. 
25 It has also been recognized that only a small fraction of domestic firms engage in export activities.  
Melitz (2003) explains this by introducing fixed export costs and heterogenous productivity across firms. 
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 However, the fixed effects estimator does not permit the estimation of the coefficients 
of time-invariant variables like distance, a variable of great interest in gravity modelling. 
Furthermore, the fixed effects estimator may not estimate precisely the coefficients of time-
varying variables when the latter do not vary very much over time. As a result, we also report 
on a random-effects estimator with cluster robust standard errors.  Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro’s (2006) PPML estimator has been widely used to estimate gravity equations on 
cross-section data because it addresses heteroskedasticity problems that are most pervasive in 
trade data. As argued by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006: 642), the data does not have to be 
Poisson and the dependant variable does not have to be an integer/a count variable for the 
Poisson estimator to be consistent. Anderson and Yotov (2010) exploit this feature when 
estimating a gravity model with a dependant variable defined by a ratio of ratios
26
 with the 
PPML estimator. The PPML estimator requires that the dependent variable be expressed in 
level, not log-transformed. Thus, our dependant variable is the ratio 
ijt
iit
m
m
 when we use a 
Poisson estimator, as opposed to the log of this ratio. In addition to the PPML estimator, we 
also report results from a random-effects Poisson estimator to account for the panel structure 
of our data. 
 4.2. Estimation Results 
The estimation results based on adjusted GI policy indicators are reported in Table 3.  This set 
of indicators is made up of dummy variables interacting with the sum of GIs in the exporting 
and importing countries to capture the marginal effects of GIs depending on whether only the 
importing country has GIs or only the exporting country has GIs or both countries in the 
trading pair have GIs. Table 3 provides results from the OLS, random effects, PPML and 
random effects Poisson estimators.
27
 All of the coefficients associated with continuous 
                                                 
26
 Their dependent variable is 
1
k k
ij j
k k
i
m y
E y

  
    
  
, where 
k
iE  stands for total expenditures on product k in country 
i, 
k
jy is the production of good k in country i, 
ky is the world’s production of good k and kijm stands for country 
j’s exports to country i of product k.  This specification makes it easy to deal with potential endogeneity issues 
related to supply and expenditures.   
27
 We considered the possibility that our GI indicators be endogenous, perhaps countries that have many GIs 
would have a tendency to trade more with one another even if they did not have GIs. Several authors have 
pointed out the need to account for this sort of issue when estimating the effects of regional trade agreements on 
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variables can be interpreted as elasticities for all four estimators. Dummy variables can also 
be given an elasticity interpretation in models with log-transformed dependent variables.  If 
ˆ  is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable of interest, then the estimated elasticity 
is   ˆ ˆ100 exp 0.5var 1       , where  
ˆvar   is the variance of the estimated coefficient 
(Giles, 1982).      
 Except for the GI coefficients, the estimation results are less affected by the manner 
with which GI variables are defined than by the estimation methods. From Table 3, we can 
see that the estimated coefficients on relative GDP are relatively close to one, as predicted by 
the theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Vancauteren and Weiserbs, 2011). This is 
especially true for the OLS and random effects estimators in columns (1) and (2). Relative 
distance coefficients are highly significant and have the expected negative sign. However, the 
PPML distance elasticity is very large, even after considering that our application focusses on 
agricultural products.
28
 As expected, the log of relative prices has a negative effect on trade 
and this comes out from all four estimators.  Our priors about common language and common 
border are for positive effects even though mixed signs have been found in the literature (e.g. 
Helpman, Melitz and Rubsinstein, 2008).  The estimated coefficients from all four estimators 
for common language are significant at the 95% confidence level. The OLS and random 
effects coefficients for common border are positive and highly significant while their PPML 
and Poisson-random effects counterparts are negative and significant.  The control variables 
for time, “year2004” and “year2009”, are highly significant (at 1% level). The estimated 
coefficient on “year2004” is positive, but that of “year2009” is negative. The positive effect 
associated with “year2004” is possibly due to the creation of the Euro currency in 1999 and 
the elimination of “old” currencies in the years that followed. The negative effect of 
“year2009” is due to the worldwide recession of 2008/2009. Using the coefficients from the 
random effects estimator (column 2) in Table 3, the 2004 and 2009 time elasticities are 
                                                                                                                                                        
the volume of trade (e.g., Vicard, 2011; Magee, 2008; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).  One way to deal with this 
issue is to use exporter-year, importer-year and exporter-importer fixed effects.  Because all of our countries 
either have or do not have GIs in all 3 years in our sample, we cannot have exporter-importer fixed effects and 
GI indicators.  The instrumental variable approach, using the number of wine and spirits GIs (by European 
country) as instruments, did not produce robust results.      
28
 The results for different types of products in Anderson and Yotov (2010: 2165) confirm that “distance is a 
bigger obstacle to trade for low value/high weight commodities”. Their distance elasticity for agriculture is -
1.091 which is similar to the ones for our models (1), (2) and (4). These high elasticities suggest that distance 
captures much more than just transport costs.   
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respectively 106% and -119%. They reflect the fast growth of agricultural trade between 1999 
and 2004 and the drastic adverse effect of the 2009 recession on international trade.    
 Given our specification, the exponential of the negative of the constant can be 
interpreted as the border effect which measures the lack of fluidity in international trade 
relative to internal trade after controlling for distance, economic size and other factors 
influencing trade. A significant negative constant term is expected and all of our estimators 
meet this requirement except for the Poisson estimators (PPML) in Table 3. The magnitude of 
the border effect varies a lot across estimators and definitions of GI policy variables. Our 
estimates from models (1) and (2) are 17.6 and 20.49. To put these numbers in perspective, 
the Canada-US border effects for agricultural trade estimated by Furtan and van Melle (2004) 
exceed 100 while the EU border effect for 98 industries in Head and Mayer (2000) is 19.5. 
Using the coefficients of the random effects estimator in column (2) of Table 3, we find that 
crossing the border is equivalent to multiplying internal distance by a factor 
[  exp 3.0265 / 1.1079 15.37   ]. Given that the average internal distance inside the EU is 
81.15 miles, the “width” of the average border is 15.37x81.15=1246 miles or 2005 km. 
Although no tariff barriers hinder trade between European countries, the border effect is 
particularly high. The thickness of the border has been attributed to the prevalence of 
nationalism, the heterogeneity of standards and regulations applied in countries and 
differences in language and culture between European countries (e.g. Allaire and al., 2005; 
Poncet, 2002). Similar conclusions about the so-called “fragmentation” of the EU market 
were reached by the European Commission in the late 1980s.
29
  
Table 3. About here 
 4.3. Impact of the Indications of Geographical Origin (GIs) 
The trade creating and trade diverting effects of GIs on trade can be qualitatively ascertained 
by glancing at the coefficients for GI variables in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) attribute a 
significant trade-creating effect to GIs when the importing and exporting countries have GIs.  
The PPML and random effects Poisson estimators show no significant trade creation effect.  
                                                 
29
 The European Commission’s White Paper (1988) diagnosed three primary barriers to intra-EU trade: 
differences in technical standards, delays and administrative burdens caused by frontier controls, and national 
biases in government procurement. 
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Because they were not able to identify a well-documented intra-EU border effect either, we 
put less weight on these estimators when interpreting our results.  The empirical evidence is 
not as clear when either the importing country or the exporting country does not have GIs. 
The random effects estimator (column 2) identifies a significant GI trade-creating effect when 
the importer has GI products and the exporter does not.  In contrast, the Poisson random 
effects estimator in column (4) uncovered a trade-diverting effect when the importing country 
has GIs and the exporting country does not.  Results across models are more consistent when 
the exporting country has GIs and the importing country does not.  All of the _ .bI adj  
coefficients are negative, suggesting trade diversion, but they are not statistically different 
from zero when a two-tailed test is used. If the alternative hypothesis under the t-test is about 
a negative effect as opposed to a non-zero effect, then the coefficient for _ .bI adj  in column 
(2) is significant at the 5.4% level.  This would mean that exporting countries with GI 
products export less to non-GI countries as their number of GI products increase.  The 
coefficient measuring the diversion effect is smaller in magnitude than the coefficients 
measuring trade creation.  Overall, the regression results support a net trade-creation effect.     
 Because the Poisson estimators do not seem to perform as well in terms of the sign and 
magnitude of estimated coefficients, we rely on the random effects results to pursue the 
investigation of the quantitative effects of GIs (see column 2 of Table 3). The estimated 
coefficients _ .aI adj and _ .cI adj  are respectively 0.0075 and 0.0076. These can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticities.  The first one tells us that an additional GI product increases 
the ratio of external and internal trade by 0.75% when the importing country has GI products 
and the exporting country does not have any. This percentage increase in trade is due to the 
addition of a new GI.  This marginal effect is almost identical to that obtained when both 
countries in the trading pair have GIs (0.76%). These effects are fairly large considering that 
there are hundreds of agricultural products.  They can possibly be attributed to consumers in 
countries with GIs having a stronger “love for variety” than consumers in countries without 
GI protection for varieties originating in countries with GI protection.
 
Perhaps GI protection 
produces external benefits that can be likened to national branding that improve the image of 
GI and non-GI protected products in countries with GI protection. However, it should also be 
pointed out that countries that do not have GIs tend to be poorer countries whose consumers 
might be more incline to buy cheaper non-GI varieties. Our model accounts partially for that 
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by explicitly accounting for differences in relative prices and relative economic size. 
However, consumer preferences in our model are assumed homothetic to express aggregate 
demand simply in terms of aggregate income, thus neutralizing distribution effects on 
aggregate demand.  It could be that our GI variables pick up also wealth effects.
30
  The gains 
for exporting countries with GIs are partially offset by a reduction in trade with importing 
countries without GIs given that _ 0.45bI adj   . 
 We can also analyse the effect of the GIs in terms of distance equivalents, as in Engel 
and Rogers (1996) and Head and Mayer (2000). Relying again on the random effects 
estimator results in Table 3, the trade creation effect of _ .cI adj  is equivalent to reducing the 
ratio of external and internal distance by a factor of 1.0066  exp 0.0076 /1.1079   .  Since 
the average internal distance is 81.15 miles, the trade creation effect when both countries have 
GIs, measured in distance reduction, is 81.71 miles or 131.50 km  1.0069 81.15  .    
 
 4.4. Is GI Protection a Non-tariff Measure for Countries without GIs? 
The WTO negotiations on the protection of GIs (discussed under the TRIPS agreements) are 
particularly difficult because of substantial differences between the European Union, which 
defends the expansion of high-level protection (accepted for wines and spirits) to all 
agricultural products, and the United States and Canada, who fear that GI protection would be 
a trade-impediment (Rangnekar, 2003; AITIC, 2005).  In this section, we want to estimate the 
effect of GI protection on the border effect, which embodies non-tariff barriers and a home 
bias effect.  We follow the approach used in De Sousa and Disdier (2006) by first 
reestimating the random effects model of Table 3 without the GI variables. Comparing the 
constants in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 confirm that the protection of GI products has a 
                                                 
30
 We wish to thank a reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention.  We experimented with an ad hoc 
specification that replaced GDP by per capita GDP and population, but this did not have a strong effect on the 
coefficients of the GI policy variables.  A better way would have been to replace the CES utility function in our 
framework by a non-homothetic utility function.  We also estimated models with , ,a b cI I I , but got a significant 
coefficient of 1.24 for cI , meaning that pairs of countries with GIs trade with one another 2.4 times more with 
one another than pairs of countries that do not have GIs. Because this specification generated GI effects that 
appeared unrealistic to us, we did not report them.      
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significant effect increase on the border effect. However, we cannot draw definite conclusions 
on the effective impact of this policy on the home bias because the inclusion of the GI 
variables affects the coefficients of other explanatory variables, including the constant (the 
border effect). To address this problem, De Sousa and Disdier (2006) suggest estimating a 
constrained model in which all of the coefficients, except for the coefficients of the GI 
variables ( _ .aI adj , _ .bI adj  and _ .cI adj ) and the constant, are constrained at the values in 
column (1).  The results of this restricted model are in column (3) and can be compared to the 
ones in column (1).  
Table 4. About here 
 The constant (-2.9615) in column (3), is larger in absolute value than the constant (-
2.7152) in column (1), and slightly smaller than that (-3.0265) of column (2).  This outcome 
can be interpreted as a GI-induced increase in home bias. From the constant in column (3), 
international trade under GI regulation is on average 19 times less fluid than domestic trade 
while the estimated border effect from column (1) is 15. Thus, GI protection leads to a 
hardening of the borders between European countries. One possible interpretation of this 
result on domestic bias would be that GIs make consumers more aware of the importance of 
the geographical origin of foods which in the end favors domestic foods.
31
  
 This indirect GI effect (observed on border effect) can be likened to a general trade 
depression effect.  This allows us to conclude that GIs have a depressing effect on trade flows 
involving countries that do not have GIs.  Trade flows involving countries with GI protection 
are also affected by this indirect effect, but these countries benefit from a direct trade creating 
effect.  
 The trade depressing effect of GI protection can be converted into a tariff equivalent (ad 
valorem tariff). This approach requires an estimate for the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties (). Thus, the tariff equivalent of the border effect is equal to expc/( – 1) – 1, 
where c is equal to the absolute value of the estimated constant. The price coefficients in 
                                                 
31
 According to Teuber and al. (2011), consumer ethnocentrism does always imply that products from the home 
region or home country are preferred. As suggested by a reviewer, GI products can be fully appreciated by 
consumers only when the latter are familiar with the GI concept.  GI awareness is likely to vary across countries, 
notably because of government regulations vis-à-vis food labels and GIs, but also across products.  Most 
consumers can probably relate more easily to GIs for wines and spirits.   
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Tables 4-5 are estimated values of .  As in Head and Mayer (2000), they are unrealistically 
small and like them, we assume that  = 9 to measure border effects in tariff equivalents. Our 
border effect in tariff equivalent based from column 3 is 44.80% while the one for column 1 is 
40.41% (according to Table 4).  The GI effect on the thickness of the border is equivalent to a 
4.39% tariff increase. If we assume 6  , the increase in the thickness of the border amounts 
to a 8.69% tariff increase while the tariff increase falls to 2.90% when 12   is assumed.  In 
short, the European sui generis Regulation of protection of GI products can be seen as a Non-
tariff Measure by countries without GIs because it increases the thickness of the border 
between EU countries.  However, this indirect effect is small, considering the effects of other 
factors contributing to the thickness of the average border between EU countries and the trade 
creation effect of GI protection on trade flows involving pairs of countries that have GIs.  
  
5. CONCLUSION 
This study analyses the impact of GI protected under the European Regulation on relative 
trade flows. Using the “border effects” model developed by Head and Mayer (2000) and 
focusing on EU countries, we confirm that the domestic bias may be greatly increased by the 
effect of the indications of geographical origin (GI). Our findings suggest that the protection 
of indications of geographical origin (PGI and/or PDO products) significantly affects trade 
between EU countries. It has been alleged that GI protection reduces information asymmetry 
between producers and consumers about product “quality” and hence creates trade. We found 
evidence of trade creation when importing and exporting countries have GIs. This was 
expected because producers of GI products will seek markets where the specificity of their 
products is most likely to be appreciated by consumers.  We also found a trade creation effect 
when the importing country has GIs and the exporting country does not, possibly reflecting a 
greater love for variety by consumers in countries with GIs.  However, we found evidence of 
trade diversion when exporting countries have GIs and importing countries do not.  It is 
hypothesized that it is harder to secure a price premium for exporters under these conditions 
and as a result there is substitution between export destinations favouring importing countries 
with GIs at the expense of importing countries without GIs. We also found that GIs have an 
adverse indirect effect on trade through the so-called border effect. GIs increase the thickness 
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of the border between EU countries.  This home-bias is not surprising because a country’s GI 
products are possibly most appreciated at home, when they evoke culture and tradition most 
vividly.  Fortunately, non-tariff measure-like effect is small.  
 Finally, one should be careful about trying to generalize our results in the context of 
bilateral negotiations between the EU and third countries, like Canada and the United States. 
Because we focused only intra-EU trade, our importers did not have to contend with exporters 
from non-designated areas that use GI labels because they own a trademark or consider the GI 
label generic. The joint recognition of GIs and trademarks by non-EU countries should have a 
positive effect on EU exports because their GI products will be marketed under the GI label, 
but in some cases it might prove challenging to take market share away from the competing 
trademarked product.  In such instances, the level of trade creation will not be substantial. 
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Table 1: Number of Geographical Indications (GIs) by EU country in 2009 
Italy (192)  Luxembourg (4) 
France (167)  Slovakia (4) 
Spain (126)  Denmark (3) 
Portugal (116)  Finland (3) 
Greece (83)  Sweden (2) 
Germany (65)  Cyprus (1) 
United Kingdom (32)  Slovenia (1) 
Czech Republic (22)  Bulgaria (0) 
Austria (13)  Estonia (0) 
Poland (9)  Lithuania (0) 
Belgium (7)  Latvia (0) 
Ireland (7)  Malta (0) 
Netherlands (6)  Romania (0) 
Hungary (4)       Total: 867 Labels GI protected 
Source: GI products registered in European DOOR database. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Bilateral import values and GI numbers by Country (1999-2009) 
 Import (in E+07)  GI Number 
Mean SD  Mean SD 
Austria 22.9 60.7  11.666 1.255 
Belguim 69.9 167  4.666 1.710 
Bulgaria 2.76 5.13  0 0 
Cyprus 2.24 4.30  0.333 0.474 
Denmark 21.3 41.1  1.666 1.255 
Estonia 2.38 3.29  0 0 
Finland 8.83 13.4  1.666 0.948 
France 102 177  124.666 34.518 
Germany 142 228  55.666 7.411 
Greece 19.0 29.8  78.333 5.283 
Hungary 8.01 14.6  1.333 1.897 
Ireland 16.6 55.6  6 0.821 
Italy 92.1 157  139.666 41.953 
Latvia 2.98 6.22  0 0 
Lituania 4.24 7.71  0 0 
Luxembourg 6.32 16.9  3.333 0.948 
Malta 1.49 2.98  0 0 
Netherlands 66.5 143  5.333 0.948 
Poland 16.8 33.9  3 4.270 
Portugal 20.3 57.8  92 18.301 
Republic of Czech    12.1 23.8  10.333 8.393 
Romania 7.04 13.8  0 0 
Slovak Republic    5.55 13.6  1.333 1.897 
Slovenia 3.49 6.77  0.333 0.474 
Spain 55.3 96.1  78.333 37.876 
Sweden 21.3 36.2  1.666 0.474 
United Kingdom    104 165  27 4.108 
All Countries 31.0 95.5  24.012 42.727 
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Table 3:  Estimated gravity coefficients accounting for the presence and number of GIs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Random Effects PPML Poisson with 
Random Effects 
     
Log relative GDP     0.9821
***
 
(0.0467) 
   0.9106
***
 
(0.0480) 
   0.8662
***
 
(0.1077) 
   0.7780
***
 
(0.0883) 
     
Log relative distance   -1.1324
***
 
(0.1121) 
  -1.1079
***
 
(0.1136) 
  -2.0853
***
 
(0.5236) 
  -1.3372
***
 
(0.2875) 
     
Log relative price   -0.6845
***
 
(0.0759) 
  -0.3304
***
 
(0.0789) 
  -0.8617
***
 
(0.1226) 
  -0.7038
***
 
(0.0972) 
     
Common border    0.7483
***
 
(0.2256) 
   0.9272
***
 
(0.2319) 
  -2.0372
***
 
(0.5523) 
  -1.1685
***
 
(0.4010) 
     
Common language    1.4447
***
 
(0.3657) 
   1.4535
***
 
(0.3560) 
   1.4820
***
 
(0.4174) 
   1.7885
***
 
(0.5148) 
     
Year 2004    0.6293
***
 
(0.0674) 
   0.7235
***
 
(0.0562) 
   2.0800
***
 
(0.2859) 
   2.0343
***
 
(0.2959)  
     
Year 2009   -0.9761
***
 
(0.1028) 
  -0.7825
***
 
(0.0991) 
  -0.5967
***
 
(0.1669) 
 -0.7931
***
 
(0.1662) 
     
_ .aI adj  0.0025 
(0.0024) 
   0.0075
***
 
(0.0022) 
-0.0661 
(0.0490) 
  -0.0296
***
 
(0.0082) 
     
_ .bI adj  -0.0043 
(0.0029) 
      -0.0045 
(0.0028) 
-0.0037 
(0.0064) 
-0.0025 
(0.0078) 
     
_ .cI adj      0.0107
***
 
(0.0010) 
   0.0076
***
 
(0.0009) 
0.0016 
(0.0023) 
0.0017 
(0.0020) 
     
Constant (border effect)     -2.8672
***
       
(.2946) 
   -3.0265
***
 
(0.2964) 
1.1751 
(0.9788) 
-0.4705 
(0.5671) 
     
N 2045 2045 2106 2106 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, pooled data by pair (importer-exporter) 
***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, and *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients for Head and Mayer’s log of relative trade gravity equation  
(Results from Random Effects Estimation of Table 3) 
 (1) (2)            (3) 
Log relative GDP   0.8702
***
 
(0.0479) 
  0.9106
***
 
(0.0480) 
           0.8702 
 
Log relative distance   -1.1743
***
 
(0.1147) 
-1.1079
***
 
(0.1136) 
          -1.1743 
 
Log relative price   -0.3308
***
 
(0.0815) 
  -0.3304
***
 
(0.0789) 
          -0.3308 
 
Common border    1.0040
***
 
(0.2495) 
   0.9272
***
 
(0.2319) 
1.0040 
 
Common language    1.4288
***
 
(0.3585) 
  1.4535
***
 
(0.3560) 
1.4288 
 
Year 2004     0.8047
***
 
(0.0525) 
  0.7235
***
 
(0.0562) 
0.8047 
 
Year 2009    -0.5345
***
 
  (0.0837) 
 -0.7825
***
 
(0.0991) 
           -0.5345 
 
_ .aI adj  –   0.0075
***
 
(0.0022) 
  0.0033
 
  (0.0021) 
_ .bI adj  –         -0.0045 
(0.0028) 
  -0.0053
* 
   (0.0028) 
_ .cI adj  –   0.0076
***
 
(0.0009) 
      0.0097
*** 
   (0.0009) 
Constant (Border effect)  – 2.7152*** 
(0.2939) 
 -3.0265
***
 
(0.2964) 
      -2.9615
***
 
    (0.0950) 
Number of observations 2045 2045 2045 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, pooled data by pair (importer-exporter) ***significance 
at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, and *significance at the 10% level 
  
 
